Almost no political leader wants this scenario to happen. But if neither the Christian Democrats and the Liberals nor the current SPD-Green coalition can make a winning ticket work, the alternative seems to be reviving a political constellation that Germany has not seen for almost four decades.

The joker in the deck is the left-wing upstart party - Die Linke (The Leftists) - led by former SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine and PDS leader Gregor Gysi. With their populist approach to the voters currently being rewarded with double digit projections, and the public pronouncements by Chancellor Schroeder that there will be no coalition involving Lafontaine and Gysi, the alternative for the SPD will be to negotiate an agreement with the conservatives.

In this agreement, the Social Democrats are highly likely to only act as the junior partner in a so-called grand coalition with Angela Merkel as chancellor, assuming the CDU/CSU retain their lead over the SPD on Sept. 18. Under those conditions, the Liberals and the Greens would be in the opposition ranks along with the Leftists and would spend the next four years shouting from the sidelines.

One might suspect that spreading rumors about a possible grand coalition might be in the interest of both the SPD and the CDU. Both sides might see it as a way to mobilize their respective supporters to make sure that the coalition does not become necessary.

But what if it does? Is this a formula for stalemate in Berlin? Would this lead to more entrenched political gridlock and put the political process in a straight jacket, disabling the government's ability to make substantial decisions about reforms and renewals Germany seriously needs? That is possible, but then again the current situation seems little better. Still, is such a coalition inevitably designed for failure?

Looking back on the first and only such experiment in the 5-1/2 decades of the FRG, one can learn some lessons.

The year was 1966 and Germany was facing some problems that would sound familiar today, even if the dimensions of the challenges were vastly different. Some dynamics that led to the grand coalition - arguments over tax reforms, concerns over rising unemployment (around a half million were unemployed through the initial period of the coalition) and a recession - are echoed almost 40 years later.

The legacy of that three year coalition remains contentious for historians. Some argue that it was a necessary transition for Germany's political culture to clarify its priorities and sharpen the profiles of its political parties. Indeed, the coalition generated a clash of ideas and policies in and outside of the government which was in many ways a catharsis for the government and for the opposition within Germany's political culture.

Vigorous debates and demonstrations marked the entire three years. The radical right party NPD emerged in the state parliament in Hessen. Student protests were angry and widespread, and some might argue that the period was an incubator for the emergence of left wing violence which occurred a decade later by the Baader-Meinhof group, among others.

Yet at the end of that period, Germany entered a new era under Chancellor Willy Brandt, and later under Helmut Schmidt, in which most Germans seemed to be more confident about the future, arguing about it still but having the feeling that, as the slogan went, they could risk more democracy - Mehr Demokratie wagen; Germans were again engaged in the political process.

The FDP under Foreign Minister Walter Scheel emerged with a much more defined platform for the party than it ever had managed before. Indeed, one could argue that this three year coalition laid the foundation for the Greens who emerged in the late Seventies and early Eighties as a force that continues to shape Germany's political direction twenty five years later.

Would such a grand coalition generate that same transition today? A grand coalition might contribute to the rise of left and right wing fringes, and the right wing presence currently in eastern German Parliaments may continue. The Leftists might last through more than one election cycle before its ability to do nothing more than complain (rather than create) would be exposed, but it would still be vociferous.

At the same time, the Greens and the FDP would be forced to strengthen their positions and aim at the failings of the coalition with specific criticisms and alternatives.

Whether there would be a repeat of the so-called APO (Ausserparlamentarische Opposition) movement, which would mobilize students and other groups to challenge the coalition, is an open question, but what if it did? The current malaise and lack of engagement among many voters, young and old, might be shaken up and could lead to a new sense of urgency about dealing with the challenges and changes needed throughout Germany today.

Is it risky? Yes, for all involved. The chancellor who led the grand coalition in 1966, George Kiesinger, did not survive beyond the three years he served in Bonn. The CDU and CSU were out of power for 13 years before returning with Helmut Kohl as Chancellor with the FDP. If Angela Merkel emerges as the head of such a grand coalition with the SPD, her fate may be similar, as she would be vulnerable to attacks from both the left and the right.

The SPD would find itself in an internal crisis, split over joining such a coalition and unable to forge a consensus with the Leftist party seeking to pull it to the left. In the first grand coalition, there were powerful leaders of the SPD like Brandt and Herbert Wehner who had their eyes clearly focused on leading the SPD in the direction of the gaining the control of the government. Today, the leadership of the SPD does not have the same control of the party.

How much leeway the public will give such a coalition is also questionable, though the grand coalition is currently preferred over a red-green and the CDU/CSU-FDP alternative by the voters. Party loyalties are not what they once were - in particular, they are missing in eastern Germany - and the public is far more volatile in its election behavior than ever before. The voting cycle has gotten very short, as has the patience of the voters.

The key question is whether the gridlock now preventing government and opposition can be overcome if both parties decide they have a common stake in the changes needed and not a common stake in blocking each other.

As long as Germany does not have a first-past-the-post electoral system like in Britain and the United States, which usually generates a clear majority and mandate for the government to make decisions without being hamstrung by the opposition, getting government and opposition into one boat to cross these troubled waters might be an alternative.

All things considered, if a coalition with the CDU/CSU and the FDP does emerge from the elections with a mandate, it would be far more preferable. Voters would expect that a new team should have a chance to solve Germany's problems while the SPD and the Greens would have to reorganize themselves and their platforms for the next electoral battle in 2009.

Expectations of a CDU/FDP coalition would be high and the need to act quickly and forcefully would be great, especially before the next wave of provincial elections could begin to provide a platform for attacks from the opposition.

But if the grand coalition option is unavoidable, the lessons of the first one 40 years ago might be simply put: it will not last long, so make the best of it. That would mean that both the leadership of the CDU/CSU and the SPD would have to commit themselves to making it work as they did in 1966. The SPD had a particular reason to do just that to prove for the first time that it was capable of governing the nation.

The CDU/CSU wanted to maintain their majority which they had enjoyed since the beginning of the Republic in 1949. In the process, the two sides accomplished a few things.

They laid the foundation for the development of Ostpolitik - relations with East Germany and Eastern Europe over the next decade - which might be called some of the first few steps that eventually led to 1989. They dealt with the economic challenges of unemployment and a recession and set Germany up for a period of growth in the following decade.

The key question is whether both political leaders and voters will share this commitment today. Not all will. If such a coalition was to get Germany moving again, it will require some serious and unflinching debates between the government and the parliament over roles and responsibilities, between Berlin and the provinces over the conundrum of federalism in Germany, about the threatening glacier of social security burdens, and among Germans nationwide about what the priorities for the country should be.

But the debates would also need to lead to action and results: these are the challenges for any government elected on Sept. 18. A grand coalition may not be a grand solution, but unless a mandate emerges for Frau Merkel and the FDP, it may be the only option. Politicians and voters need to be prepared for that.

Jackson Janes is the executive director of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.

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