Iran may have passed the point of political no return in its bid for nuclear capabilities, said a leading national security scholar at a Washington conference Friday.

Ray Takeyh, professor of national security studies and director of studies at the Near East and South Asia Center at the National Defense University, said that although the initial inception of Iran's nuclear program was for strategic purposes, it has since attracted various patrons and constituents who are pressuring for continuation. There is a certain threshold, he said, at which political pressure both from within and from perceived external threats are so great that detonation becomes inevitable. If Iran has not crossed this point, he added, they are certainly awfully close.

Speaking at a panel discussion held by the Center for American Progress, a non-partisan think-tank, he referred to Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi's demand in a June statement that Iran be recognized as a member of the nuclear club, stating, This is an irreversible path. Kharrazi also claimed that Iran is now able to operate the full nuclear fuel cycle, although it is not now enriching uranium, a material necessary for the construction of atomic weapons.

Although it is impossible to test the veracity of this claim, said Takeyh, it does appear that Iran may be able to complete their nuclear program without further external assistance. If this should be the case, he said, traditional counter-proliferation measures, for example export control or economic sanctions, are unlikely to be successful.

There is currently a strong unity developing in Iran, said Takeyh, which rejects outside intervention on the grounds of sovereign rights and dignity. He noted that even the usually progressive Iranian students had demonstrated against capitulation to the additional protocols put forward by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

He emphasized that Iran is pursuing weapons for the purpose of deterrence particularly against the United States and a politically unpredictable Iraq, and to a lesser extent Israel and Pakistan, nations that it sees as posing an existential threat.

The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s left two specific imprints, said Takeyh, the desire for self-sufficiency in all aspects of defense, and a lack of reliance on international treaties. The international community, he pointed out, was somewhat lukewarm when Iraq started employing chemical weapons against Iran.

Iraq, he said, historically has ambitions of predominance in the region, which may not end with Saddam, and now may be armed by America. The possibility of a strong American proxy as a neighbor is a strong incentive towards proliferation, he said.

Iran also finds the Bush doctrine of regime change and military force as a preemption of proliferation particularly disquieting, said Takeyh.

P.J. Crowley, a senior fellow at the Center and former special assistant for national security affairs to Clinton, agreed. The unfortunate rhetorical flourish of Bush's Axis of Evil speech has made diplomatic relations and policy maneuvers much more difficult, he said.

In addition, Iran has seen in the case of North Korea that nuclear capability can generate a different type of relationship with the U.S. and the international community, Takeyh continued, leading to economic gains and assurances of security.

He cited, in a report presented at the discussion, a November 2003 article in a leading Iranian newspaper associated with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which stressed that having access to advanced weapons shall cause deterrence and therefore security, and it will neutralize the evil wish of arrogant powers to attack other nations and countries.

Officially however, Iran maintains its nuclear scheme, announced in September 2002, is for peaceful energy purposes. On visiting the country in early 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered previously undeclared facilities and materials that were in breach of Iran's Safeguards Agreement. The Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei called for additional protocols and inspection teams began visits to the country in August that year.

In October 2003, the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany gained commitments, during a visit to the country, that uranium enrichment and processing activities would be suspended, that full cooperation would be given to the IAEA and that additional protocols would be signed.

Speaking at the discussion Friday, Martin Briens, counselor for politico-military affairs at the French embassy in Washington, said that developments since then had presented a mixed picture. Cooperation has improved, he said, but has not always been timely, and the additional protocols, though signed, have yet to be ratified by the Iranian parliament.

Uranium enrichment was suspended, he noted, but in late June the Iranian government announced that it was resuming the production of uranium centrifuge parts, a development seen by Washington as further confirmation of Iraq's determination to pursue nuclear weaponry.

Briens said Iran must implement all IAEA resolutions, allow full inspections and ratify promptly its additional protocol. He admitted that the process was not perfect, but said there were few reasonable alternatives available.

However, he said, there is a positive way out of the crisis. He advocated making clear to Iran that the international community is ready to improve relations if it meets its nuclear obligations, and offering dialogue on long term cooperation.

Rose Gottemoeller, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and previously deputy undersecretary for defense nuclear nonproliferation in the U.S. Department of Energy, agreed that Tehran must be convinced that nuclear development is not in its national interests. Through pursuing a normalization of relations with Iran in a manner similar to Libya, Iran may be persuaded that dialogue and engagement is more beneficial than isolation and nuclear pariah status, she said. However she cautioned that the use of pressure sticks must not be dropped completely.

Takeyh noted that in past cases of nuclear reversal, such as South Africa, have occurred largely as a result of a perceived change of strategic environment. Iran is unlikely to change course, he said, on the threat of military intervention or economic strangulation.

Decades of such sanctions ultimately did not persuade Pakistan, he added.

He advocated instead bilateral discussion between the United States and Iran, saying that IAEA intervention was largely counterproductive as it encouraged nationalistic opposition. The IAEA, he added, doesn't deal with the demand side, arguing that reformist voices within Iran could be utilized to lessen the pressure on the government to continue the program.

Much benefit could be reaped, concluded Takeyh, from an expansion of the relationship, commercially and diplomatically between Iran and the United States. An Iran which feels more safe in its immediate environment, he said, is an Iran that may actually voluntarily restrain its nuclear ambitions, but certainly an isolated, coerced, beleaguered, sanctioned, threatened Iran is unlikely to dispense with its nuclear program.