The success of the Russian military operation in Georgia and the effective use of older weapons systems like the venerable T-72 there should remind Western political leaders and their advisers of several hoary old principles of war.

First, obsolete weapons are as good as supposedly state-of-the-art ones when you have them and your opponent does not.

Second, military power is always relative rather than absolute. Comparative advantage is crucial. The Russians don't have remotely as many T-90s for their own army as they would like. There have been many delays and bottlenecks in the production process in recent years. But they could still use T-72s to make up the numbers, and against an opponent like Georgia, that was more than enough.

Third, the Russian army in Georgia proved that it was indeed a real army. It may have been a pale echo of the extraordinary Red Army that defeated Nazi Germany in 1941-45 in the largest and bloodiest war in human history, and it appears still to lack the capabilities that allowed the Red Army in 1979 to occupy the main centers of Afghanistan virtually overnight. But the Georgians, after years of being encouraged, equipped and trained by U.S. military advisers, fell apart under the impact of the Russian attack.

Fourth, arguments by Georgian sympathizers that the Georgians either wisely retreated as a force in being or were right to rapidly retreat because they had no chance against the Russians do not bear serious scrutiny.

The Georgians were facing an outright invasion that conquered one-third of their country in five days with minimal casualties to the attackers. Their officers and soldiers knew that if they could hold up the Russians even for one day or three with a notable show of resistance, this would greatly enhance their government's diplomatic position and international credibility. Such a credible show of resistance could have forced the invading Russians to scale back their ambitions and demands. But there is no evidence that any of the Georgian combat units put up any such effective resistance anywhere.

Finally, what Russia did in Georgia, it could easily replicate throughout Eurasia. The Kremlin enjoys excellent diplomatic relations with China, India and Iran, the three other main military land powers in Asia with which it shares common borders.

Outside the NATO nations, only Ukraine has the size of population and military forces to put up more than a tiny token opposition to any Russian military incursion, unless U.S. and European leaders would be willing to risk a potential nuclear standoff by sending their own Rapid Deployment Forces to intervene. And, again apart from the United States, the main NATO allies in Europe lack any significant rapid deployment capabilities themselves.

All this means that Russia's stalwart old T-72s might be seeing a lot more active service, and enjoy a far freer range and radius of operational action, than anyone outside Russia ever expected.