President Barack Obama told The New York Times, in an interview published Sunday, that he is willing to talk to the moderate elements of the Taliban in order to reach a negotiated end to the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, now in its eighth year and showing no end in sight.

A question that was put to this correspondent Sunday in a television interview by a reporter following Obama's statement to the NYT was how can there be "moderates" among such an extremist group as the Taliban? How can there be moderates among a group that took the country back to the Middle Ages and then some; that stoned to death women accused of adultery at half-time during soccer games in crowded stadiums? A group that dynamited ancient giant statues of Buddha; that banned the arts, music and even the flying of kites?

The answer is that everything is relative. Of course, there is a "moderate" wing of the Taliban, just as there must be a hard-line wing, too. Just like there was a moderate wing of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. Did that make them any less communist? The real question is how moderate are the moderates? And can the United States do business with them?

The West -- the United States and the Europeans, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allies involved in the Afghan war -- should not be in the business of nation-building. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was intended to decapitate al-Qaida and deny the group its safe haven in Afghanistan, thus denying it a safe base of operations from which it could plan and execute further Sept. 11-like attacks against the West and any other country not in agreement with its philosophy.

Much as in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan got off to a good start, but then the situation very quickly began to deteriorate. Focus -- as well as much needed resources -- was diverted to Iraq, where the previous administration felt there was far greater urgency.

The start of the war in Iraq is when the pace of the war in Afghanistan shifted. The war in Iraq suddenly took precedence over the war in Afghanistan.

The chase to hunt down al-Qaida and the Taliban slowed down and -- here is the inexcusable mistake -- the Taliban and their allies were allowed breathing space where they were able to regroup, re-arm and re-organize. Years from now, military historians will look at the U.S. experience in Afghanistan as a model of what NOT to do.

But that is history, and now we should be looking at the future of Afghanistan, rather than its past. Just how will a U.S. exodus from the country affect, first, Afghanistan itself? Second, its immediate neighbors, such as Pakistan and Iran? Third, Europe? And, ultimately, the United States?

As costly and complicated as continued involvement in Afghanistan may be, in the long run it remains more cost-effective than a premature pullout when you consider the following:

First, how will it affect Afghanistan? Abandoning the Karzai government will send the wrong message to any current or future group about allying itself with the United States. It will further drive home the message that the United States cares little, if at all, for the rest of the world. A more politically and ethically correct policy would be to speed up the empowerment of the Afghan government and military and let them assume the destiny of their future with better odds than they would if the Taliban were involved.

Second: Pakistan. Nuclear-armed Pakistan should make the rest of the region extremely nervous, with the Taliban, with whom many Pakistanis, including some in the military and in the intelligence services, sympathize, giving the extremist elements in Pakistan a solid base. Does the rest of the world really want that?

Third: The Europeans and NATO. Much as they dislike having to contribute to the Afghan war effort, they are far better off today fighting in Afghanistan rather than at their own borders.

And finally the United States. Understandably, given the economy and the cost involved in the war, the Obama administration wants to disengage as quickly as possible. However, what is needed here is a completely new approach to the way this war is being fought. Conventional armies do not fare well in unconventional wars. What is needed in Afghanistan is a new approach in which greater use of covert operations is utilized. This might not be pleasing to many, but it remains the most realistic and feasible approach to fighting and winning this war.

(Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times.)