One of the casualties of last month's military confrontation between Russia and Georgia has been Western complacency about the security of using Georgia as a transit corridor for energy. Of the five Caspian nations now producing oil and natural gas, neither Russia nor Iran has ever used the Caucasian energy corridor, while Turkmenistan's natural gas exports to potential Western markets remain as yet in the future.

Of the Caspian nations, Azerbaijan is the one that is most committed to Western export, most notably in its use of the Western consortium's $3.6 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which opened in May 2006. Shortly before the clash of Georgian and Russian military forces, BTC was damaged by an explosion on a valve in the Turkish segment of the pipeline, which set alight 4 miles of the pipeline and led BP, the operator of the pipeline, to shut it down for nearly a month while repairs were undertaken.

It has long been a mantra of the U.S. administration that "happiness is multiple pipelines," and no Caspian producer has embraced Washington's ethic more thoroughly than Kazakhstan, which has developed transit routes to the west through Russia via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium's pipeline to Russia's Novorossiysk port on the Black Sea, a pipeline under construction east toward China and southward via an increasing indigenous tanker fleet across the Caspian to Iran. While currently sending the bulk of its oil exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline westward to Novorossiysk, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has lost no opportunity to develop additional export pipelines, signing an agreement with China to construct a pipeline and sending small volumes of oil on tankers across the Caspian Sea to Iran for oil swaps.

Of all the Caspian riparian states, Kazakhstan has discreetly and persistently pursued a burgeoning relationship with Azerbaijan, of all the former Soviet petro-states the one most firmly in the Western camp. While last month's confrontation between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia bottled up Azeri exports, Kazakh oil exports via the CPC continued unhindered.

For years Kazakhstan has also held talks with Azerbaijan about the possibility of utilizing the pipeline to export rising volumes of oil exports, but the recent Ossetian military confrontation undoubtedly has caused the Kazakhstan government to rethink this option, at least in the short term.

The sophistication of Kazakhstan's energy policies in juggling myriad competing interests is due in no small part to the policies of Nazarbayev, one of the Soviet Union's great survivors.

On Dec. 21, 1991, Nazarbayev was one of 11 Soviet republic leaders, out of 15, who signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, by which the republics agreed to form the Commonwealth of Independent States; four days later Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev formally dissolved the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev is one of only two of those leaders still in power. Since that time he has adroitly fostered Kazakh nationalism and independence, reforming the economy while remaining mindful of his giant neighbor to the north. While keeping on good terms with Moscow, Nazarbayev has pursued other export options, using his country's oil revenues to begin direct investments in neighboring former Soviet republics.

One of these, however farsighted it might have seemed at the time, became a casualty of the recent Caucasian confrontation between Russia and Georgia, having a direct negative impact on Astana's bottom line. In February the Kazakh state energy firm KazMunaiGas bought Georgia's Batumi oil terminal on the Black Sea, which subsequently was closed during the military operations, blocking its 200,000 barrel per day shipments in port.

Such inconveniences aside, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are continuing to deepen their relationship. Earlier this week Azerbaijan opened a Consulate General in Kazakhstan's Caspian port of Aktau. Azerbaijan's ambassador to Kazakhstan, Latif Gandilov, praised the initiative, saying, "The activity of the Consulate General is an important event, because Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are strategic allies. Aktau will be a diplomatic city after Astana and Almaty." Kazakh Mangystau province Gov. Krimbek Kusherbayev was similarly fulsome, stating that Azerbaijan's commitment to establishing the Consulate General proved the importance that Baku attached to cooperation with Kazakhstan in economic matters. The Azeri Consulate General will cover Mangystau province, the cities of Atirau and Aktobe and Kazakhstan's western provinces. About 6,000 Azeris live in Mangystau province, most connected with the oil industry.

What is notable about the Azeri-Kazakh relationship is that the Consulate General, based in Kazakh's developing Caspian port, does not carry the threat implications to the Kremlin of Western-financed pipelines, but rather represents a regional matter, as the Caspian is closed to foreign shipping.

In the last decade both countries have developed tanker fleets: the Caspian Shipping Co. of the Azerbaijani Republic now has the largest fleet on the Caspian, with 41 of its 86 vessels being tankers, while beginning in 2002 KazMunaiGas subsidiary Kazmortransflot began buying tankers, basing its fleet in Aktau. In August 2005 Kazmortransflot took delivery of its first tanker, the $18.75 million Astana, which since has been joined by sister ships Aktay, Abaj, Kazakhstan and Almaty. As the sole entrance and exit to the Caspian is the Volga-Don Canal, under Russian control, it seems unlikely that for the foreseeable future one is likely to see either Western tankers or foreign warships delivering humanitarian aid.

The burgeoning Azeri-Kazakh maritime trade indicates that Russia is not seeking to quash the development of Caspian energy, but that it prefers as little foreign development there as possible, a lesson from South Ossetia that both Astana and Baku doubtlessly are studying closely.