With the end of the war not yet declared, many experts think it premature to draw definitive lessons from a victory over what has been called an "inept" and weakened enemy.

Loren Thomson of the Lexington Institute declared that "the US fought a string of pygmies" in Iraq.

The experts warn that remaining pockets of Iraqi guerrillas are the achilles heel of US forces, particularly since US troops are traditionally more comfortable at war than in peace-keeping operations.

But apparent victory after a three-week war confirmed that the Americans are superior, in the air, on land and at sea, with precision guided bombs, sophisticated hardware, force coordination, training, logistics, intervention, intelligence, and special forces.

Anthony Cordesman, in a war analysis for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said, "The US had vastly improved every aspect of its intelligence, targeting, and command and control capabilities since the Persian Gulf War.

"The United States and the United Kingdom began with a war plan reflecting extraordinary professionalism and experience," he said. "When elements of that plan failed during the war, the coalition rapidly adapted."

That professionalism and adaptability in planning "was greatly aided by major advances in computerization and integration at every level," said Cordesman.

The US Air Force said Thursday that 70 percent of some 23,000 bombs used in Iraq were "smart" -- either laser- or satellite-guided -- against seven percent during the 1991 Gulf War, a detail also applicable to some 750 cruise missiles.

That, it said, accounted for the relatively small number of civilian casualties in urban areas.

According to hospital sources and figures from the Iraqi government before its fall, there were between 484 and 856 civilian deaths and between 4,411 and 6,606 wounded since the war started on March 20.

By comparison, some 5,000 French civilians died in 1944 during a one-hour allied bombing of the port of Le Havre, which killed not a single German soldier, French military historian Philippe Richardot pointed out to AFP.

"We've come back to the German blitzkrieg," he said. "In other words, strike with air power and advance at the same time."

That was the US strategy in Iraq: relentlessly pounding enemy armor as infantry divisions advanced.

Still, the size of US ground forces and global strength promises to be a hot subject for debate between analysts in the Pentagon's civilian side and the US Army.

At the outset of the war in Iraq, several former US generals as well as active officers criticized Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for his strategy of using smaller, more mobile ground forces, a strategy for the moment confirmed by results.

Under the gun as much from doctrine as the approaching summer desert heat and political pressure to quickly oust Saddam Hussein, Rumsfeld and operations chief General Tommy Franks began the war with 300,000 US and British troops, half that in the Gulf War, including 100,000-125,000 directly into Iraq.

Many officers said it wasn't enough.

"You need boots on the ground to seize the ground," many said.

"There is a contradiction," said Harlan Ullman of the CSIS. "You need more troops for peace than for war.

"We need to relook at shock and awe," he said. "Where it worked was in demolishing the Iraqi army quickly. If we had done that at the beginning of the war, along with all Saddam Hussein's levels of power, throughout Iraq, not just Baghdad, we would have had a quicker collapse."

Whatever else they say, none of the critics has thus far faulted the still-growing and evolving role of CIA and special forces commandos in battle, in recruiting partisans and informants, in "painting" targets for smart weapons.

The Iraq war was also expected to lead US strategists to orient themselves more towards "floating bases" to launch operations without dependence on unpredictable allies, noted Jane's Defence Weekly in a reference to Turkey.

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