. 24/7 Space News .
Columbia, The Legacy Of "Better, Faster, Cheaper"?

a delayed retirement allowed an aging space ship to pass its use by date, while cutbacks stripped quality control processes.
by Raymond Anderson
Sugarloaf Key - Jul 15, 2003
The day Columbia rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center, (KSC) for it's first trip to the launch pad was one of the most exciting days of my life. The "Gem of the Galaxy" was truly a magnificent site.

This was it, the beginning of a dream. The shuttle program was taking it's first operational baby steps and Columbia was leading the way as the pathfinder test vehicle.

Most of us believed this beautiful machine would fly for ten years or so and be retired to the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum for future generations to admire.

It was not to be. Twenty-three years later she is gone. Her final role was to give seven magnificent people the opportunity to live their dream of space travel and service to mankind.

No matter what physical event caused the accident that destroyed Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003, I believe she was ultimately the victim of an aging human space flight program that has lacked leadership, vision, and commitment over the past decade.

In 1992 Dan Goldin became the NASA administrator and brought his "better, faster, cheaper" approach to a shuttle program that was already eleven years old. The program had lost one vehicle and crew and had experienced multiple near misses.

At a time when NASA should have been launching a vigorous program to develop available new technologies for human access to space, Mr. Goldin's focus was to cut costs, streamline, and downsize. The direction from NASA Headquarters and the Clinton Administration was to "do more with less".

This became the business model of the '90's at KSC. Mr. Goldin reduced human space flight funding from 48 percent of NASA's total budget to 38 percent. He also reduced the NASA workforce by a third and spearheaded the effort to transfer day-to-day space operations to a single private contractor. (1)

This agenda produced noticeable changes in the work environment at KSC. Many experienced managers and engineers were taking advantage of early retirement incentives resulting in a major loss of critical engineering and management skills. And, the routine threat of reduction-in-force layoffs and loss of employee benefits had a devastating affect on employee moral.

The single contractor approach was intended to cut costs by eliminating redundant management structures and technical skill overlaps.

However, the quality assurance checks and balances system inherent to a multiple contractor work force environment was lost. Also diminished was the independent critical focus and certification of flight readiness each contractor had on the system under their control.

In addition, the planned and directed elimination of government involvement in day-to-day shuttle processing resulted in the absence of NASA quality assurance participation in routine shuttle processing operations.

A Dangerous Legacy
During the "better, faster, cheaper" era we were told the space program was going to be run like a business. Well, human space flight is not a business. It is a very delicate and fragile marriage of mechanical technology, theoretical science, and human knowledge and courage.

You cannot apply standard business management models to this endeavor. Mistakes and misdirection in business can be corrected. Mistakes in human space flight programs result in the loss of precious life and national resources.

Before "better, faster, cheaper", when shuttle launch pads 39A & B were under construction and activation, all engineering work orders were subject to a priority system.

Top priority and maximum quality assurance went to those that carried the designation LOVC, Loss of Vehicle and Crew as a possible consequence if the work order was not properly accomplished. One of the biggest concerns was maintaining the pristine integrity of the orbiter's thermal protection tiles.

During one of the early launches a piece of debris was observed in the slow motion launch film. It was determined that the object was a piece of silicone rubber ablative coating that was used to protect the Solid Rocket Booster hold-down posts.

It had lost adhesion and become a piece of Foreign Object Debris, (FOD). An LOVC work order was issued to remove all of the ablative coating from the launch pad. Shuttle program managers were very conservative in those days. Any concern regarding the possibility of debris striking the orbiter, either during processing or at launch, was addressed and fixed.

In the post Columbia disaster briefings NASA program managers said they had "become comfortable" with pieces of the external tank insulation coming off during launch.

I think they had survived so many near misses over the years that they failed to maintain the rigor in the system that would have fixed the problem and possibly prevented the catastrophe.

They should have at least developed and implemented a contingency plan to repair the damage should it occur. If repair wasn't technically possible they should have stopped flying until the issue was resolved.

Before another shuttle countdown is initiated all legacy "better, faster, cheaper" programs and policies should be identified, discarded, and replaced with a new agenda of "quality, safety, integrity". A technical expert, not "the engineering community", should be responsible and held accountable for every critical flight system.

For example, who is the person that has personal knowledge that the external tank insulation was applied properly and will not lose adhesion and fall off? If you can't identify anyone with this responsibility then the program is fundamentally flawed.

You have to make quality assurance and certification of every critical flight system a person's job like in the old underwear commercial, "it doesn't say Hanes until I say it says Hanes".

We know the loss of Challenger was preventable. I believe we will also learn the Columbia disaster was preventable. What a terrible waste.

(1) http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/features/goldin.html

Raymond Anderson began his career at KSC as a technician in 1971. During the late '70's and early '80's Anderson was an engineering specialist involved with corrosion control processes for shuttle launch facilities and ground support equipment. Anderson has held program management positions at NASA's Langley Research Center in Virginia and at Vandenberg AFB in California. His last assignment at KSC was Director of Strategic Planning for EG&G Florida, Inc., the KSC Base Operation Contractor from 1983 through 1998. The content of this paper are strictly Anderson's personal opinion, judgment, and recollection of events unless identified by source.

Related Links
SpaceDaily
Search SpaceDaily
Subscribe To SpaceDaily Express

The End Of US Manned Spaceflight Looms Ever Closer
Los Angeles - Jul 09, 2003
It's possible that NASA will have no capacity at all to launch its astronauts into space if a decision on building an affordable and technologically sound crew transport vehicle is not made soon warns Jeffrey F. Bell. In this detailed analysis of NASA's orbital space plane concept Bell uncovers yet another fiasco in the making.



Thanks for being here;
We need your help. The SpaceDaily news network continues to grow but revenues have never been harder to maintain.

With the rise of Ad Blockers, and Facebook - our traditional revenue sources via quality network advertising continues to decline. And unlike so many other news sites, we don't have a paywall - with those annoying usernames and passwords.

Our news coverage takes time and effort to publish 365 days a year.

If you find our news sites informative and useful then please consider becoming a regular supporter or for now make a one off contribution.
SpaceDaily Contributor
$5 Billed Once


credit card or paypal
SpaceDaily Monthly Supporter
$5 Billed Monthly


paypal only














The content herein, unless otherwise known to be public domain, are Copyright 1995-2016 - Space Media Network. All websites are published in Australia and are solely subject to Australian law and governed by Fair Use principals for news reporting and research purposes. AFP, UPI and IANS news wire stories are copyright Agence France-Presse, United Press International and Indo-Asia News Service. ESA news reports are copyright European Space Agency. All NASA sourced material is public domain. Additional copyrights may apply in whole or part to other bona fide parties. Advertising does not imply endorsement, agreement or approval of any opinions, statements or information provided by Space Media Network on any Web page published or hosted by Space Media Network. Privacy Statement All images and articles appearing on Space Media Network have been edited or digitally altered in some way. Any requests to remove copyright material will be acted upon in a timely and appropriate manner. Any attempt to extort money from Space Media Network will be ignored and reported to Australian Law Enforcement Agencies as a potential case of financial fraud involving the use of a telephonic carriage device or postal service.