The general approach of these somewhat inexpensive recommendations is to continue to pursue the idea of prelaunch quality control and inflight data collection (presumably for after-accident information analysis) to lower the likelihood of accident occurrence.

However, the recommendations appear to do nothing to increase the options available to shuttle crews after an accident has occurred. The plan they support requires perfect prelaunch generation.

It also discounts the potential for inflight accidents, such as from further launch-phase events, collision with space "junk", collision with meteorites, or deliberate damage.

In wartime, great efforts are made to assure that downed airmen have options, even when exercising those options may cost more in lives or dollars for rescue efforts than the number of lives saved or the value of the personnel recovered. That is because when warriors are placed in harm's way, to aid their nation, they must believe that their nation will, in turn, come to their aid if fortunes turn bad.

The shuttle mission is classified as a peacetime mission, and is run by a peacetime agency. But if shuttle crews face the same level of danger as soldiers, then, might it not be true that shuttle crews need the same level of support for accident contingency plans?

So, it is discouraging to anyone holding this view that the preliminary recommendations discussed contained no new options to deal with shuttle crew recovery, in the event of shuttle tile damage. A more encouraging result might have brought these preliminary recommendations:

1. On every mission, a space walk-around (an on-orbit inspection that would discover damaged tiles) before initiating the return to Earth.
2. A replenishment rocket (on alert) to ensure a crew could be sustained until it could be evacuated from a damaged shuttle.

There are costs involved in implementing these recommendations. But, once implemented, the costs would be absorbed over time because these two recommendations would provide backup for all future manned missions.

In the case of the space walk-around, the Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) package necessary for EVA mobility has not always been carried on each mission. Also, there are not handholds on the Shuttle, making EVA activities difficult. However, perhaps this can be overcome if a miniaturized camera extended on a boom were to be used. Or, the same camera could be placed on a maneuverable (compressed air-propelled?) mini-satellite stabilized by a gyroscope. This might save a great deal of crew exertion and weight versus the manned-EVA option.

In the case of the replenishment rocket, it seems that only a maneuverable final stage needs to be manufactured, to carry food, water, electrical power, and possibly fuel to a damaged shuttle. This final stage would be launched with an existing rocket.

While these two recommendations might take some time to bring to operational readiness, if they were being pursued, it would raise the morale of the crews, while closing a gap in planning that currently exists. That gap represents risk of a disaster that would be on the order of 9-11 in the emotional involvement of US citizens.

If shuttle crewmembers discovered a problem with their craft that meant it would not survive re-entry into Earth's atmosphere, and nothing was done, these astronauts would gradually run out of oxygen, or food, or water, or power, and perish, with at least most of their last days fully televised. A

rescue shuttle mission might be re-generated at an amazingly unsafe pace; this holds the potential for a double-disaster. Possibly a Russian rescue mission could be generated, but this might run the same risk. Such a drama might demoralize the public and threaten the entire US manned space program. It would likely be the biggest debacle NASA could imagine, just the reverse of Apollo 13.

That is why it is presumed earlier in this article that the inflight photography recommended would not be subject to immediate photo-analysis for real-time results - because there is no accompanying plan to use those results in some type of effective accident-recovery action.

So why, if the potential outcome is so disastrous, is there a hesitancy to prepare against the disaster once it occurs?

The problem may be that the board is using a constrained-solution process. That is, they are ruling out solutions ahead of time that have large costs. Such an attitude seems even likely, given the amount of budget currently being diverted to fight terrorism in its many aspects. It must be a standing order from above to expect no new funds.

However, it may be time to sign up to solutions of significant cost, if that is what it takes to be effective. The US manned space program provides the impetus for America's military space presence, upon which world stability depends. The manned space program, in turn, depends for its livelihood upon the good will of US citizens. To retain that good will, US manned space missions must be composed of dreams, not nightmares.

Thomas Blow is a former Airpower Research Institute analyst, now retired near Dallas, Texas.

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